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

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
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THE WIDER OUTLOOK BEYOND THE WORLD WAR

BY

CHARLES E. HOOPER,

Author of "The Need of the Nations: An International Parliament," etc.

LONDON:

WATTS & CO.,

JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.C.

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A PRUSSIAN OFFICER ON PEACE

"Whoever fights in this war in the front ranks, whoever realizes all the misery and unspeakable wretchedness caused by a modern war.....will unavoidably arrive at the conviction, if he had not acquired it earlier, that mankind must find a way of overcoming war. It is not true that eternal peace is a dream, and not a beautiful one at that. A time will and must arrive which will no longer know war, and this time will mark a gigantic progress in comparison with our own. Just as human morality has overcome the war of all against all; just as the individual had to accustom himself to seek redress of his grievances at the hands of the State after blood feuds and duels had been banished by civil peace, so in their development will the nations discover ways and means to settle budding conflicts, not by means of wars, but in some other regulated fashion, irrespective of what each of us individually may think."

—Baron Marschall von Bieberstein.

(Quoted by the "Daily News" of January 2, 1915, from a letter which appeared in the "Berliner Tageblatt" of December 24, 1914. The letter was written on October 18 from the trenches, the writer being a captain of the Reserves and Prussian "Landrat," and a son of the deceased German Ambassador to Britain. He has since fallen on the battlefield.)

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

THE WIDER OUTLOOK

BEYOND THE WORLD WAR

I

AIM AND SCOPE

During several decades most of the nations of the world, and especially those of the European Continent, have, though at peace, been diligently preparing for war. May not this singular process be now reversed? May not the peoples who are either actors or sorely tried spectators in the present gigantic conflict agree to make, even in the midst of strife, some significant preparation for the future maintenance of international concord? It is possible to regard our brave soldiers as actually engaged in paving a way to true tranquillity, through the horrors of the field of battle and of villages and cities laid waste. Should not the thinkers and statesmen of all countries be now planning to establish the world's peace, when it is once more won?

There are some patriots who wish to keep passion at white heat, and fear that a reasonable frame of mind and any discussion of peace at so critical a time as the present may interfere with recruiting and military efficiency. My own patriotism is greater than theirs. It extends to regarding my fellow countrymen, from Tommy Atkins to Lord Kitchener and from the humblest civilian to Sir Edward Grey, as essentially reasonable beings, whose sense of duty to the British Empire and her Allies will not be diminished, but stimulated,

by the thought that the Allied Nations have now a great opportunity for serving Humanity—for promoting the future peace and progress of the civilized world.

The preparation for peace which (at the moment of writing) it is possible to make is not any adjustment of the rival claims of the nations at war. The fighting men must continue to do their part for some considerable period before statesmen can have any hope of effecting a settlement which would not invite a recurrence of strife in the future. The true preparation for peace consists in the preparing of men's minds to take a large and wise view of international relations, in urging the publicists and politicians of the Treaty Powers to exchange views among themselves and with representatives of neutral States on the future regulation of the world, and especially in remembering that no *ad hoc* settlement of international affairs can ever be final—that what is really wanted is a *system* for adjusting future differences of nations, whenever and wherever they may arise. *It is not too early to turn our thoughts to these matters. It may be too late when the war is ended;* when citizens and statesmen are full of pride in national achievements, conscious of their really enormous debt to army and navy, and naturally disposed to defer to militarist counsels.

For the purpose of this pamphlet it will be best to leave the vexed question of the various wrongs done or sustained by nations engaged in the present world war to the verdict, not merely, I trust, of the future historian, but of the Special International Conference which ought to be, and probably will be, convened on the cessation of hostilities. How precisely the great upheaval came about, and who were chiefly responsible, are inquiries likewise lying beyond the scope of the present pages. The practical and pressing question to which it is hoped to give some tolerably clear answer is simply this :—

Is it desirable and possible to make an end of war between civilized States?

I shall plead that permanent peace is essentially desirable, and shall endeavour to indicate broadly how its achievement has come within the reach of political wisdom and goodwill. A full discussion of the latter point would involve some tentative scheme for reforming and building up international law and instituting an International Polity, and that will possibly form the topic of a subsequent pamphlet. It may here be mentioned that the present writer published anonymously in 1907 a little book entitled *The Need of the Nations: An International Parliament.* Of course, the "nations" took no notice of that brochure, and, even had they become aware of its existence, would not have been likely to act on its advice. But the present outbreak of war has set me thinking anew about the above bold project, and endeavouring to formulate some suggestions which may not be without interest for progressive spirits who work in the domain of practical politics. A brief forecast of these rejuvenated ideas was given in a letter to the *Arbitrator* of December, 1914. In the present pamphlet I shall do no more than hint at what the International Polity might be.

II

THE PARTING OF THE WAYS

Humanity now stands at a great parting of the ways, and every thinking human individual becomes a force making either for militarism or pacifism as the governing principle of the future. Those who have no clear conviction either way are a dead weight on the side of militarism; since militarism is still predominant, and has ruled the world, during the peaceful era of building up the German army and the British navy to their present dimensions and high pitch of efficiency, just as truly as it rules over the shattered towns and corpse-

strewn trenches of France and Belgium or the mined areas of the North Sea. The one present hope for pacifism is that millions of people, including hundreds of influential politicians and men of letters, who were either militarists or of undecided mind at the outbreak of this war, have been or are being compelled to think and feel anew and *will* the better way. From this point of view many pacifists may be inclined to agree with Mr. William Archer, when he welcomes the prolongation of the grim struggle simply for the lesson it is likely to teach. He writes:—

"The great point is that war between civilized peoples should, once for all, work out its own *reductio ad absurdum*, and demonstrate the monstrous disproportion between its ravages and its results. A rapid and brilliant 'steam-rollering' victory for the Allies would have left that demonstration incomplete."

Of course it does not follow that there is no good and great object possible to be gained by the Allies. Most pacifists, on our side, agree with the militarists that there is such an object; though the militarists may not agree with them as to its true nature. They think that this war should help to secure the liberties of small nations, and to usher in a new era of internationalism, which, as it appears to many of them, might have actually taken concrete shape ere now had it not been for the ascendant influence of militarism and imperialism in Germany. They believe, therefore, that the present appeal to armed force ought to be prosecuted unflinchingly on our side for the sake of a future lasting era of peace and international justice; but they do not think that it ought in future to be necessary to fight for that justice between nations which might be lawfully administered, and they blame the militarists of their own and all countries, as virtual accomplices of the militarists of Germany in creating those conditions from which the present war emerged. They blame them for helping to cause an incredible expenditure of blood and money and an incalculable sum of human misery in order to settle problems

which might have been far more effectually solved by pacific means. Moreover, they hold that the great social cataclysm itself will fail to have any good results unless it is followed by a resort to those rational methods which might conceivably have obviated its occurrence.

III

PACIFISM VERSUS MILITARISM

Let us now consider more exactly what is meant by being a *militarist* and a *pacifist* respectively. And first be it said that militarism is not necessarily German, and *is* essentially respectable. It is *the* respectable doctrine, accepted in all aristocratic British circles, and has very little likeness to that truculent monstrosity called militarism, which has become a scapegoat for the *Times* and the *Daily Mail* as well as a bogey for the recognized organs of Liberal-conventional opinion. By a *militarist* we should simply understand a person who holds that war is, and must continue to be, an inevitable incident in the life of nations. He may or may not consider that war acts as an ennobling stimulus, or as a salutary medicine, on peace-surfeited communities. He does consider that wars are bound to recur from time to time, and that these include, not only wars between the more primitive and barbarous communities, or wars having barbarism on one side and civilization on the other, but wars between highly civilized States themselves. A *pacifist*, on the other hand, is one who believes, not simply that peace is essentially desirable, but that it is quite possible to establish lasting friendly relations between all the civilized nations of the world, and, indirectly, between all human communities; since the more backward peoples have come, or are coming, under the rule and tutelage of the more advanced. To put the matter briefly, a militarist holds by

the necessity of occasional wars, while a pacifist believes in *the possibility and desirability of permanent peace.*

The militarist is not necessarily an imperialist, pining for world dominion. He is not necessarily a Jingo, who would go to war on slender provocation or with a light heart. He need not even be one of those who dwell on the glories of war, when waged in a really good cause. His differentia, or distinguishing mark, is that he regards war as a naturally recurring condition of things, which cannot be averted by any agreement of nations, and must therefore be prepared for by each nation on its own account, by training and arming a sufficient number of fighting men and providing as many fortresses and ships of war and ingenious engines of wholesale destruction as possible. A pacifist may agree with him that such preparations have been wise under certain conditions, but the pacifist does not believe that they must always continue to be necessary, and he emphatically denies that the making of huge preparations for war is the proper way of ensuring peace.

The pacifist, on his part, is not necessarily or usually a peace-at-any-price man. Those ultra-pacifists whose conscientious scruples or natural timidity would prevent them from arming to save their country from actual invasion are even less representative of pacifism at large than is the Jingo of militarism at large. Pacifists are now to be found in the fighting ranks as well as in civil life, and, whatever may be the value of the frequent boast among the Allies, Belgian, French, and English, that they are battling against the principle of militarism, there is no reason to treat it as sheer hypocrisy. There are men now consciously risking or laying down their lives, not merely "for king and country," or for their respective countries, right or wrong, but for the future peace of Europe and the progress of the world.

Suffice it, then, that there is a perfectly clear issue between militarism and pacifism as above defined. Any man or woman who has a definite opinion on the subject must be either a

militarist or a pacifist, and cannot be both. But many people have as yet formed no definite opinion, and it is especially to them that the pacifist must address his propaganda. Only thus can he hope to turn the scale in human affairs; for hitherto, as was noted previously, the balance has always dipped on the militarist side, and peace itself has been the bond-slave of war.

IV

WAR AND CIVILIZATION

If we are condemned to form our judgments about the future simply by referring to the past, there is no doubt that the militarist has a strong case. Not only have the nations repeatedly flown to arms, but some half of the human world is now engaged in a colossal war, accompanied probably by greater slaughter of combatants, and entailing more widespread misery upon non-combatants, than any prior conflict in the world's history. Faced by such facts as these, many people who are pacifists at heart are in danger of becoming cynical, and I can imagine a person asking himself the question, "What after the war?", and proceeding to answer it, in a series of imaginary comments on the newspaper items of the future, somewhat as follows:—"Heavy indemnities imposed on the vanquished parties. Some considerable readjustments in the map of Europe. The transfer of certain colonial possessions from this Great Power to that. Victorious generals duly idolized and handsomely rewarded. Tommy Atkins thanked and forgotten. Peaceful life resumed by the stricken peoples on the old uncertain tenure—believed to be good for some years after so great a 'purgation' of the European system. Many commercial failures compounded. Mammon re-enthroned as a god second only to Mars, and the renewed scramble for profits at any and every expense to humanity

affording a mild and pleasing alternative to the overt slaughter of our country's enemies. Armament manufacturers rich enough to retire for good, but having no such intention, and adding all the persuasive force of their adopted newspapers to the prestige of the victorious armies, in the interests of continued militarism. The peoples of the Continent still slaves to conscription, and England becoming a conscript nation for the first time in her history. Nothing whatever done to prevent a recurrence of war when some king or his ministers shall feel themselves strong enough to tear up any of the treaties which circumstances have forced upon them."

A picture such as the above might turn out to be only too true. Nevertheless, the earnest pacifist will see to it that, in so far as his own voice counts for one and may win other voices, the facts of the future shall be distinctly different from and better than those of the past. This may involve optimism on his part, but it is not an unreasonable optimism. He has good grounds for believing in the reality of progress—of moral-social-political evolution, which is by no means a uniform and calculable process, but gathers secret strength even in times of reaction, and produces many startling and unforeseen adaptations to new needs. He therefore denies that we can adequately judge the future of humanity either from historical records of the past or from inductions based on such records. Real humanity is not mankind in the generalized sense, concerning which natural laws of a sort may be formulated. It is mankind as a unique collective aggregate of locally-interacting historical nations. The relations between these nations, like the nations themselves, are unique, and form the accumulated legacy of a remote past, unique at all its stages. We must, of course, employ general terms in referring to them; but such terms always miss some of the concrete fullness of historical reality.

It may be said, in general terms, that international interdependence consists, on the material side, of reciprocal benefits through industry and commerce, and, on the spiritual side, of

a certain community (pervading the inevitable diversity) of ideas, sentiments, laws, and customs, and a common heritage of literature, science, and art. War destroys much of this interdependence for the time being, and as between the particular belligerent nations or groups of nations; and it is easily conceivable that a recurrence of wars on the terrible and unprecedented scale of that now being waged would practically destroy human civilization. Nevertheless, wars have appeared hitherto chiefly as temporary interruptions in the peaceful intercourse of nations, and it is not on the ground of war being likely to destroy civilization, but on that of its inherent wickedness and stupidity, and of all the present misery and future privation which it needlessly entails, that it ought to be done away with. For, after all, those mitigations of the lawlessness of war and of the sufferings entailed by it which spring from modern humane sentiment are more than counterbalanced by a variety of added horrors, due to the modern perversions of applied science to purposes of destruction and carnage; and war, on its offensive side, remains at least as hideous a thing as it ever was. Its glories resolve themselves into licensed homicide, robbery, and arson, on the grandest or ugliest scale; while so-called legitimate warfare is accompanied by all manner of outrages, which, though forbidden by the none-too-rigorous law of nations, are inevitably enacted by criminally-inclined soldiers or ruthless commanders in the course of a great campaign. The present war has proved in certain respects more devilish than any previous conflict, and it may safely be said that the devilries are not only on one side; though the deliberate encouragement of savage practices which set international law at naught cannot be charged to the Allies. As regards the various barbarities of which the German commanders have been guilty, I will cite only the well-attested and systematic practice of taking and holding hostages —that is, perfectly innocent civilians, who are liable to be murdered, and are frequently murdered, for the alleged crimes of a populace which they have no means of controlling.

V

ARMED RESISTANCE AND NATIONAL KNIGHT-ERRANTRY

But if armed aggression be essentially wrong, is not armed resistance to such aggression essentially right, and is not armed intervention on behalf of outraged and oppressed nations at least contingently right? Under existing conditions, all but extreme advocates of turning the other cheek to the smiter would answer the first question in the affirmative, and all who have outgrown the now-almost-impossible doctrine of national insularity, or international *laissez-faire*, would return a like answer to the second. The average pacifist would agree with both answers, but he would qualify them by the two following judgments:—

(1) Aggression by one civilized State against another should be forbidden by international law.

(2) Armed intervention, when necessary, should be by the collective action of civilized States supporting any injured nation, and not by individual Great Powers or groups of such Powers, who may seek to turn intervention to their own advantage, and whose action naturally arouses jealous suspicion among other States.

The crying need is to substitute a régime of international law lawfully administered for one of selfish aggression on the part of certain great nations, and would-be knight-errantry on the part of others.

Despite Bernhardi and Bernard Shaw, I believe that there is such a thing as national knight-errantry, and that the righteous indignation of nations is not always a hypocritical cloak for promoting national self-interest. Whether or no the judgment be due to patriotic prejudice, it seems to me that many Englishmen advocate fighting, and many of the best English soldiers are often sincerely desirous of fighting, not

merely for "king and country," nor to win new provinces for the Empire or military renown for themselves, but *to put things right*—to punish wrongs that were not done to England, or restore the liberties of downtrodden peoples outside our own dominions. But, as the days of personal knight-errantry are past, so those of national knight-errantry are numbered. Let us hope that the present great international tournament will prove to be the last of such exercises in chivalry; for certain it is that, whatever interested motives the Allies may have, the action of Germany in Belgium has placed France and England in the position of knights-errant, vowed to avenge the wrongs and restore the integrity of a small but gallant nation; while the high-handed action of Austria towards Serbia had previously given occasion for Russia to assume the knight-errant *rôle*.

VI

ARBITRATION PLUS MEDIATION VERSUS WAR

May the Allies succeed in doing justice, and inflicting no more injustice than is unavoidable, by force of arms! Yet common sense assures us that such force cannot be relied on when any righteous cause is in question. Each of the present knight-errant nations has stood idly by while wrongs were being done to some helpless people in the past, and each had the excuse that to intervene might precipitate a great war and entail far more human misery than ever flowed from the misdeeds which should have been avenged. Moreover, there is not the slightest guarantee that the purest knight-errantry on the part of a nation will succeed in its object. All depends upon whether the nation which is acting the part of the ferocious free-booting baron of mediæval times is strong enough to add the knight-errant nation to the list of its other victims. It very possibly *is*.

It is thus never anything more than a lucky chance if

justice is done by military methods. We tacitly admit as much when we forbid duelling or any sort of trial by combat. Clearly the only way to establish justice between nations, as between individuals, is to inaugurate and appeal to some properly constituted Court of Justice. No Court can ever be infallible; but the likelihood of an experienced and high-minded judge or bench of judges giving a wrong verdict is infinitely less than the likelihood of a strong nation imposing its unjust will on a weak one. Yet I am far from thinking that an authoritative International Tribunal is the only thing needful for securing peace. It is always desirable to resort to friendly reasoning and mediation before soliciting a judicial verdict; and thus the second (if not the first) great desideratum in the interest of peace is a system of *open and detached diplomacy*, whereby all nations would take counsel together and formulate *international recommendations*, which would not be binding on any nation unless freely accepted, yet would frequently be accepted, thus obviating the necessity of appealing to any Court of Justice for a final decision.

In other words, there should be a representative and permanently assembled or available International Council, which would at once act as informal intermediary between any particular nations, and as formal intermediary between certain particular nations and the International Tribunal. The latter would exist to interpret and administer international law, not to make it. The Council would be the instrument for consolidating and extending international law itself. It would fulfil these functions, not by making international laws over the heads of the various national legislatures, but by formulating and provisionally passing model statutes, which would become binding on as many nations as freely adopted them, but on no others. While the Tribunal should, of course, be composed of experienced judges, adepts in international law (a subject which must inevitably expand far beyond its present dimensions), the Council should consist of popular statesmen, by whom the democracies of the various countries would feel

themselves worthily represented. To this end the Parliaments, and especially the Representative Chambers, of the various States should take part in electing delegates to the International Council; while the Council, in conjunction with the national Governments, should decide all questions as to the constitution and convening of the Tribunal, and the upholding of its authority, both by the submitting of appropriate cases to its judgment and the enforcing of its rulings.

Naturally, one of the chief difficulties in forming an International Council such as is here desiderated would consist in deciding how many delegates the respective nations should be entitled to send. I would suggest that every sovereign State, and certain colonies and provinces which, though not sovereign States, have legislatures and social characters of their own, should each be entitled to send one delegate at least. Each of the greater nations might elect one delegate for every five millions of educated adult population shown at its last census —of course, excluding the population of colonies or provinces having independent representation in the Council. This plan, while securing to each of the smaller national units a voice in the Council, and while debarring nations like China, India, and Russia from a representation in proportion to their millions of illiterate subjects, would nevertheless give to the various Great Powers equitable shares of international influence; their "greatness" being estimated by the civilized (and *ascertainable*) standard of a population which can read and write, and so possesses the rudiments of all higher culture. The institution of the suggested Council and Tribunal, as reformed substitutes for the present Hague Conference and Tribunal, need not be contingent on the nations agreeing not to go to war. The work of these bodies would, of course, be greatly simplified if it followed on a comprehensive treaty-law of compulsory* arbitration; but, if no such treaty-law

* Compulsory in the sense that all nations, great or small, *bind themselves* to resort to arbitration; not in the sense that the stronger nations forbid the weaker ones to resort to arms.

were negotiated, they would still be powerful factors making for the maintenance of peace.

VII

THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE

The only genuine glory which ever attaches to war does not belong to fighting, as such, but to the great ideals of national freedom and resistance to tyranny which inspire certain actors in certain wars waged against aggressive empires or oppressive overlordship, or to some cognate humane principle, such as the suppression of slavery. But must we fail to seek inter-State justice through judicial channels because it may sometimes chance to be reached through the hideous agencies of bullet and bayonet, big guns, and high explosives? Must we suffer war to continue, in order that patriotism may win an occasional crown of martyrdom? If the nations, acting together, have power to say that there shall be no more aggressive wars—small nations shall henceforth be guaranteed against the lust for territory and dominion on the part of great ones—must this manifestly just and beneficent decision be any longer delayed for fear that no small nation in the future shall have the glorious privilege of displaying the heroism of a decimated, shattered, outraged, and down-trodden Belgium? The question is too ridiculous!

"Peace with honour" is a good motto, but "Peace with justice" would be a better, for so-called honour is not always just; and "Peace with justice and progress" seems best of all, since the securing of the minimum rights of man has its natural complement in the living of a fuller human life. The condition of peace is not an end in itself. It is merely a means to the well-being of fraternal communities, and the consequent happiness of an increasing number of individuals.

Tolstoyans and other optimistic pacifist-quietists hold that ultimate peace may be brought about by moral forces alone. The view here adopted is that it cannot be brought about without appropriate political measures. These stand to moral forces in the community much as an act of volition stands to moral sentiment in the individual. But just as good deeds ultimately rest on good intentions, so must salutary political steps result from the prevailing moral disposition of the community.

The moral supports of peace may be said to be four—namely, fraternity, fidelity, love of justice, and reasonability. Fraternity involves a kindly reciprocity, opposed to national arrogance and ambition, and also of course to overt aggression. Fidelity means the strict adherence to engagements, which contrasts with the tearing up of treaties as "scraps of paper" on the wholly immoral plea of "military necessity." Love of justice is a natural outcome of the two preceding virtues, since justice is that which prohibits or punishes aggression and the breaking of agreements. Reasonability is the crowning political virtue. It is by far the most difficult virtue for a "Great Power" to manifest. It is diametrically opposed to that false pride which always refuses to admit a fault or to accept a judgment running counter to its own supposed interests or real prejudices—that pride which frequently masquerades as love of justice, because it confuses abstract justice with what *I* or *we* or *my party* or *our nation* choose to call just. Reasonability is, moreover, that essentially *parliamentary* virtue which invites free inquiry and frank discussion, and is thus the antithesis to lying partisan propaganda, to systematic espionage, to political intrigue and secret diplomacy, and the chief antidote to that atmosphere of universal suspicion which falsehood, treachery, and secretiveness unite to create.

VIII

THE NEEDED REFORM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The world is now receiving a striking object-lesson on the very small value which attaches to international law in the eyes of the truculent rulers and conscript forces of a highly perfected military State. Probably many of these redoubtable warriors do not know that international law exists. If they are to be taught that it does, the rest of the civilized world must now, once for all, make up its mind on the subject.

The jurists assure us that international law has three divisions, referring respectively to the relations of States at peace, to those of belligerent nations (mitigating the barbarities of war), and to those between belligerents and neutrals. What is now known as "the law of peace" covers rights and obligations under the five heads of independence, property (chiefly territory), jurisdiction, equality, and diplomacy. I venture the opinion that, if rights and obligations under the first three heads were reasonably defined and their definitions commonly accepted, there could be no more wars. As things go, however, a considerable part of international law is concerned with the mode of conducting war.

According to Mr. J. T. Lawrence, a recognized authority on the question, "Modern International Law does not attempt to decide upon the justice or injustice of war in general, or any war in particular. It leaves such questions to International Morality." This is strictly in accordance with the principle laid down by the same writer, that "the rules of International Law are to be discovered by observing the conduct of States in their mutual dealings; its method is mainly historical and inductive"; and again: "The express or tacit consent of States to be bound by the rules of International Law is generally regarded as the sole and sufficient foundation for their authority." An exponent of law has, of course, to state what

the law is, and not what he considers it ought to be; and Mr. Lawrence says, very truly, in another place: "International Law advances by means of the growth of opinion; and to its students belongs the responsibility of influencing the minds of men in favour of righteousness in all transactions between States."* A pacifist, therefore, is at liberty to say that, although international law does actually leave the question of war, together with many other pertinent questions, to international morality, it ought not to do so, but should "advance by the growth of opinion" to an explicit prohibition of war between civilized States.

IX

HUMANITY'S OCCUPATION OF THE GLOBE

While the moral principle of international justice is diametrically opposed to national aggrandizement at the expense of other nations, the common sense of political economy shows that war is incompatible with the true material interests of the modern world. I shall not, however, repeat any of the arguments of Mr. Norman Angell, who has made this branch of the subject specially his own. The pacifist who is bent on slaying the dragon of militarism has many strings to his bow, and the one which I wish to employ, before closing this brief plea for collective sanity, is the humble and elementary string of political geography. At an early period in human progress the relatively civilized nations lived here and there on the face of an unmapped and practically unknown globe. There was room for nomadic tribes to wander far and wide. There were huge stretches of land that no nation owned, and whose potential riches no keen-eyed Companies sought to exploit. At a

* The foregoing quotations are from *A Handbook of International Law*, by J. T. Lawrence, M.A., LL.D. (Macmillan; 1913); pp. 91, 6, 15, 7.

comparatively late period Rome aspired vainly to become a world empire, when it was not even in touch with the greater part of the world. All that is now changed. The whole earth has been accurately mapped out, and any districts which have not been surveyed in detail fall within those larger countries which are well known. The arctic and antarctic regions have both been explored. Almost every land which is not occupied by one or other of the recognized civilized States (and, in this connection, China should certainly rank as civilized and sovereign) comes within the allowed Sphere of Influence of some such State. This means that it is now becoming possible, as it was never before equally possible, to delimit all frontiers of Sovereign States and their Colonies or Spheres of Influence, and to agree that those frontiers shall not be extended in any direction without a lawful international warrant. Frontiers cannot be fixed for all time, and it is not desirable that they should be so fixed; but territory should be allowed to pass from one Power to another, or a misgoverned State to be absorbed in a well-governed one, or a progressive subject nation to become an independent State, only on conditions approved by the International Council or sanctioned by the International Tribunal; both of which would, no doubt, insist on consulting the wishes of any civilized population, when affected by a proposed alteration in its status and allegiance. All such questions should come, in the first instance, before the Council, and, if its advice were not accepted by one of the parties concerned, recourse should be had to the Tribunal, whose ruling should be final.

X

"THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN"

The theory of any nation having a mission to impart civilization (to say nothing of religion) through military

occupation is always a dangerous one, and becomes utterly false and pernicious when employed to excuse aggression by a great nation on a lesser nation, whose civilization, though not exactly agreeing with its own, stands approximately at the same level. Here the great nation and the lesser nation have each a right to prefer its own type of government, law, and custom; and, if so, it is clear that the greater power of the great nation gives it no right to impose its rule or its ideals on a weaker people by force of arms. It is a different matter when a highly civilized Power comes into contact with savage or barbarous tribes, or with small States tyrannically governed or plunged in anarchy. It then sometimes becomes a duty to put down certain inhuman practices or prescribe certain salutary rules with the backing of armed force, and the fact that the carrying out of this duty may be connected with the motives of acquiring territory and exploiting native labour does not justify the argument that the alleged duty is merely a hypocritical pretence. An International Council and Tribunal could, between them, take up "the white man's burden" (which is also to some extent the yellow man's) in earnest, seeing to it that in future no systematic atrocities in any community, and no gross oppression of helpless natives by "civilized" syndicates, shall be permitted. These are cases in which international sentiment, acting through an international organ, might properly intervene, but in which no one of the Great Powers can now intervene without drawing the violent suspicion of all the other great and little Powers to its own real or supposed nefarious designs.

XI

UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

My last paragraph has an obvious bearing on the building up of the British Empire in the past. It is clear that the

motives underlying that development have been very mixed, and by no means always creditable to England; but our now great sister State, America, when she entered on her independent career, taught us a lesson which our statesmen have had the sense to take to heart. Its results are patent to-day in the wonderful rally to the British flag of the self-governing Colonies and native Indian States. In fact, we have somehow arrived at a sort of polity which is new in the history of the world, and it is really a gross libel on the British Empire to call it an *empire*. That term has almost always stood for a military autocracy on the model of Rome, after its republican institutions were either suppressed or rendered farcical. There was indeed a Roman *Empire*, which later split into the rival Empires of West and East, the mantle of whose imperial and religious traditions has fallen upon Austria and Russia respectively; while the Prussian hegemony of Germany is, like the shorter-lived and less systematic Napoleonic domination, a monstrous modern revival of the old imperial ideal of military autocracy, in a social environment which is totally unsuited to it. The British Empire is not an empire in this sense, and if we may hope to see it more effectually consolidated or intimately united than at present, that must be by its becoming less rather than more *imperial*. It may perhaps become a United States of Greater Britain, under the nominal and strictly constitutional sovereignty of the English monarch, and having a so-called Imperial Parliament for the regulation of inter-State affairs and the promotion of common interests. Such a Parliament would naturally leave an even larger measure of self-government to the widely scattered States of the new British Union than the United States constitution leaves to its component members.

A fellow pacifist with whom I have corresponded suggests, as the most practical way to peace, a federation of the nations of the British Empire on certain specified democratic lines, which would throw open its doors to all other nations willing to join and agreeing to abide by the given conditions of

federation. The British Empire might thus, in time, develop into a Federation of All Nations, pledged to perpetual peace. We Britons must, however, remember that this Empire of ours, despite its pre-eminent extent, which is no true measure either of excellence or of power, constitutes only one among the eight or nine Great Powers of the world. Of the others, France and the United States share the best of our ideals; they are in form more democratic than, and in fact at least as progressive as, we. They do not want to be taken under our wing, or to seem to be so taken. Thus, if what might be called a Democratic League of Peace were to be framed, Britain, France, and America should co-operate from the first in framing it. The inception of such a League need in no way interfere with the closer consolidation of the British Empire. In any case, the United States of Greater Britain should be so constituted as to form no menace to other nations, but rather to assist directly in the promotion of international law and friendly intercourse between all peoples.

XII

A LEAGUE, AS ALTERNATIVE TO A LAW, OF PEACE

Although the consistent pacifist must advocate a régime of universal arbitration, he may not think it immediately practicable, and he ought to be prepared with a second-best solution of the problem which militarism creates. This would be a League of Peace, as suggested in the last paragraph. If an influential group of States should voluntarily resign the supposed right of making war on one another, and at the same time agree that no one of them would carry on military operations outside its own territory without the consent of the others, and that the defence of their respective territories

should be a common duty, this (though a much less desirable solution than a frank all-round acceptance of the principle of arbitration) would probably secure the peace of the world in the end. If such a League should be formally approved by the three Great Powers, Britain, France, and the United States, Italy might be invited to join; so that the two chief representatives of strictly constitutional Monarchy would be linked to the two chief representatives of Republicanism, and the right of entering the League might then be extended to as many of the smaller nations as are either Republics or truly constitutional Monarchies. Russia, Japan, and China, and, if possible, Germany and Austria themselves, might be admitted on giving certain guarantees, which the Common Council of the League should approve. As many States as actually joined the League would be at once relieved of all military competition between themselves, and would only have to make sure that their aggregate navies and armies remained sufficiently strong to cope with any probable hostile combination of outside Powers.

There would, of course, be the remote possibility of a rival League of Peace being formed, and of the two Leagues ultimately going to war with one another; repeating, in fact, on a still more terrible scale, the procedure of the Triple Alliance (so called) and the Triple Entente (so proved). This, however, seems a somewhat fantastic eventuality, and its realization might be guarded against. The Hague Conference, or any thoroughly international body taking its place, might be invited to consider, and, if approving, give its explicit sanction to, the constitution and objects of the League; thus recognizing the League as essentially friendly to those nations which may not have become members of it, and, consequently, placing any rival combination outside the pale of international law.

No doubt many democrats may feel that a League of Peace between liberty-loving nations is more desirable than a treaty of universal arbitration between all so-called civilized States. We certainly do not want a treaty which might

indirectly strengthen autocratic rulers or ruling castes against the liberties of subjects or subject States. There are, indeed, dangers attendant on all experiments; yet progress consists in making experiments, and my own view is that democratic ideals will win their way best under a condition of assured peace. Thus, while I should not advocate admitting Russia and Germany, without special guarantees, to a limited League of Peace, I think that they might, if they would, become, at the close of this war, parties to a universal Treaty of Arbitration. That would logically involve a general, if gradual, disbandment of armies, and the cessation of active militarism. Most of the energies which the nations now spend on warlike preparations would then be inevitably diverted to internal development. The very men who might have led armies to victory would be winning victories of peaceful organization and reform.

XIII

THE WORLD WAR AND ITS TROUBLED SPECTATORS

At the time when I write these lines six out of the eight recognized Great Powers of the world are at war. Most of them are fighting "for all they are worth," or, as some of them at times profess, for their very existence. Two of the smaller sovereign States have been plunged from the first, and three others have been already drawn, into this whirlpool of armed strife. Of the remaining Great Powers, Italy may decide to throw in her lot with the Allies. In that case, the only Great Power remaining neutral would be the United States of America. There are, however, the large majority of relatively small nations, and there is China, the most populous and pacific of all States, still adhering to the policy of peace.

Now let us not forget that the belligerent Powers, taken collectively, have made themselves, and are making themselves, a terrific nuisance to these neutrals. The world's finance almost collapsed at the outbreak of hostilities; belligerents and neutrals suffered a common impoverishment from the fall of securities. The commerce and industry of neutrals have been interfered with in a dozen different ways. The laws of contraband are a standing grievance, augmented rather than ameliorated by the usage of the present war. Not a few innocent subjects of neutral States have fallen victims to Teutonic mines and torpedoes, or been exposed to aerial bombs. Others have undergone varied sufferings incidental to being stranded in a militarist madhouse. Switzerland has been robbed of most of her tourists. Holland has been flooded with Belgian refugees. Rich Americans have lost their European playground. Some half-a-dozen small nations are morally entitled to claim indemnities for being forced to mobilize, at a huge cost, in self-defence, when the quarrel was none of theirs. If, then, the neutral nations should bring certain pressure to bear towards making a speedy end of the war, I do not say that we should yield to it before the chief ends of the Allies are gained, but we could not reasonably resent it as fiery spirits engaged in a free fight may resent interference on the part of benevolent bystanders *who are not sufferers themselves*. The neutral nations are sufferers, and are, on the whole, long-suffering ones.

XIV

THE DUTY OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS

While it is not, at least from the Allies' point of view, the duty of the neutral nations to interfere with the course of the war, it certainly is their duty to claim a voice in the settle-

ment of various issues which the war has raised, and to insist on the reorganization of international life on a better basis than it has ever had in the past. It is much to be wished that President Wilson, as the trusted spokesman of the greatest of the neutral Powers, might succeed in marshalling all other neutral nations, great and small, into a compact body agreed, if not on the principle that war between civilized nations should cease, at least on the principle that, *since war between any two or more nations may have prejudicial effects on many other nations, all future disputes between nations shall be laid before an International Council, whose advice shall be carefully considered by the Governments concerned before they commit themselves to any active hostilities.*

In this age of universal commerce and easy communications—of steamships, railways, postal and telegraphic systems, and aircraft—the human world has become too much of an organic unity to admit of any countries being simply indifferent to the concerns of other countries. At present mankind may be said to be a vague sort of organism, which needs a central nervous system to regulate the working of its various organs. In ancient times the Roman Empire, and in the Middle Ages the Roman Catholic Church, attempted to supply some such system; but neither could permanently subdue the heterogeneous life of the European peoples, to say nothing of that of the whole world. In fact, the nations cannot be subdued to any one pattern either of civil or religious life; but they may yet learn to reconcile their idiosyncrasies in the working body of an organized Humanity. With that high aim in view, a properly constituted International Council might well play the part of a central nervous system.

Should the nations agree to enter on a full polity of pacifism, owning a supreme arbitral Tribunal as well as a representative Consultative Council, it would not be a case of all assuming permanent neutrality, but of none ever becoming neutrals. All would be friendly allies in the bond of peace, and at the same time potential belligerents against any Power

which persisted in defying international law as interpreted by the Arbitral Court. International law itself would be altered by the entire ruling out* of what is now known as the law of neutrality. There would still be a contingent law of belligerency; but this would apply to the action of the whole protective forces of civilization against any recalcitrant nation which it might be necessary to coerce. Except for this, the law of nations would be an enlarged version of what is now known to jurists as the law of peace. The law of peace would have become supreme.

XV

THE DUTY OF PROGRESSIVE STATESMEN

The mass of the public in all lands must always be inarticulate, while writers who care more for serious reflection on the broad aspects of human experience and conduct than for self-advertisement and brilliant befogging rhetoric are generally condemned to remain as voices crying in the wilderness. The triumph of pacifism must therefore largely depend on the pacific and progressive statesmen of the world taking the lead to which their position entitles them, and making a new and fruitful use of it. It is their duty to actively promote, rather than merely to echo, public opinion on the subject. Those British politicians who believe that international relations might be placed on a healthy and secure footing should not hesitate to put themselves in correspondence with the American statesmen who avowedly hold this view, and should also solicit the influence of leading spirits among their continental Allies in paving the way for a great friendly discussion, by accredited representatives of all nations,

* Not, of course, by the Court as such, but by a treaty-law voluntarily negotiated by the independent Powers.

of the world's future conduct of world affairs. Even if this Conference fell short of the splendid achievement of a treaty-law of compulsory arbitration, it could hardly fail to insist on a bold remodelling of the Hague Conference and Tribunal, which would make of these instruments far more efficient and trusted means for promoting good relations between civilized States than they have hitherto proved. The Conference would have either to resolve itself into or to arrange for the appointment of *a standing International Council, which would not merely meet, like the present Hague Conference, once in seven years, but would exercise a continual watch over international affairs.* The nations should never henceforth allow themselves to relapse into their old attitude of mutual isolation, with sporadic alliances and ententes aiming to maintain an impossible balance of power against rival combinations. That order of things gives perpetual opportunity for the militarists to triumph over liberty and progress with their cry to prepare for all contingencies—to drill more and more soldiers—to invent and manufacture, at an ever-increasing cost, new and deadlier materials and instruments for destroying men and cities. These sage counsellors are always prophesying future wars, while their methods are always tending to create those wars, and thus fulfil their own prophecies. Then they exult in their prescience, and in the renewed glories of war, so long as their own side seems likely to win; but Humanity suffers in any case. Let Humanity begin to act. Let the nations, now rudely awakened from their dream of peace arrayed in shining armour, seek peace in the only rational way—through the final exaltation of civil above military institutions. One of the civil institutions required is a recognized Tribunal for administering international law as it stands. Another is a permanent Council for promoting the growth of salutary international laws—a Council composed of trusted delegates elected by the various States, and ready at all times to discuss international relations and tender its weighty advice to the individual Powers.

A seat in the International Council would be one of the highest honours that any human being could attain to, and only statesmen or political thinkers of acknowledged eminence in their respective countries would appear in this potential Parliament of the World. Such men (or men and women), while naturally promoting their own nations' interests and views, would be quite capable of taking a detached survey of international questions, and of acting as true citizens of the world—honourable representatives of the whole great human commonwealth. They would know well that the material interdependence of all modern nations is the most solid of facts. They would feel that an ultimate moral unity of mankind is the most sublime of ideals.

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